Lost in the Forest of Tigers. The United States' Search for a Coordinated Plan of Action in Vietnam, 1959-1961.

摘要

This essay attempts to determine why the United States resorted to the use of combat troops in Vietnam in 1965 which signaled a failure in the counterinsurgency plan and the inability to execute a coordinated plan of action between all instruments of power. It answers this question by examining the period from 1959 to 1961 when the Vietcong insurgents were growing in strength and the United States was relying on the military, economic, and political instruments of power to resolve the situation. Rather than relying on the use of direct force, the U.S. attempted to build up the South Vietnamese government, military, and economy so that it could be a self sufficient nation capable of defeating the insurgency in their country and, if necessary, defend against a possible North Vietnam invasion. The primary tools that the U.S. relied on to assist in strategy development and implementation in this effort was the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG later the MACV) under the Department of Defense and the U.S. Embassy under the State Department. This essay predominantly relies on primary source information from the Foreign Relations of the United States series and The Pentagon Papers in describing how the lack of coordination and interaction between these two agencies spread to Washington and resulted in the reliance on the military instrument of power to resolve a situation which was widely recognized as being a political problem. The plan that emerged from this environment, titled The Basic Counterinsurgency Plan for Vietnam was signed by President Kennedy shortly after taking office in 1961. This early heavy reliance on the military instrument of power established by this plan would escalate after 1961 to the eventual commitment of combat troops in Vietnam in 1965.