Doctrinal Challenge of Winning the Peace Against Rogue States: How Lessons from Post-World War II Germany May Inform Operations Against Saddam Hussein's Iraq

摘要

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) gave official recognition to what the terrorist attacks of 11 September made all too clear: the United States must develop new strategies to contend with weak, failed and rogue states. While the U.S. exhibited extraordinary military prowess in promptly defeating the Afghani Taliban, decisions about how to confront a rogue state such as Iraq depend on more than new calculations of U.S. resolve and military capability. The U.S. also must find a way to 'win the peace', to replace rogue regimes with responsible governance after any military conflict ends. Frustrations in the 1990s demonstrate the growing gap that must be overcome between U.S. warfighting and peace operations doctrines. Post-World War II occupation experience provides insights for building a new doctrine that will be military, interagency and international in character. U.S. success in Germany resulted from carefully changing civil conditions rather than imposing stability, rushing to democracy or rushing to the exits. The U.S. military played a reluctant, but necessary leading role. The U.S. military needs to prepare to do so again, for unless the United States develops an effective plan to win the peace, it risks failure in overcoming the evils of rogue regimes.