Limited War in a Revolutionary Setting: Application of Clausewitz's Principles in the Vietnam Conflict

摘要

The United States failed to consider Clausewitz's principles for the relationship between the political and military objectives in a war while North Vietnam gave primacy to the political objective, ensuring all other efforts supported it. The strategy adopted by the Johnson administration to wage the Vietnam War failed to provide clear objectives to govern the military action. Gradual response allowed the North Vietnamese time to adapt to changes enacted by the American forces. By the Tet Offensive in 1968, American public opinion and portions of the government would no longer support the war and sought an end of United States involvement in South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese realized they faced a superior enemy and utilized tactics that countered the American way of war. The primary goal and focus of the North Vietnamese effort remained the political objective throughout the war and all other action (military, psychological, economic, and diplomatic) supported the accomplishment of this goal.