Understanding Counterinsurgency in Democratic Settings: Counterinsurgency Success and Failure in Kashmir and Nepal.

摘要

This analysis examines India's ongoing counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign in Kashmir and the Nepalese campaign against the Maoists from 1996 to 2006. Both COIN efforts have encountered extensive ethnic mobilization and problematic border relations and have experienced failures and successes of varying degrees at different times. To find a better COIN approach in complex environments, this thesis applies the basic framework of an integrated set of political, socio-economic, and security elements of COIN strategies. While the enemy-centric COIN approach was only able to contain the insurgency during the 1990s, recent success in Kashmir after 2000 has been achieved through a mixed approach that integrates all available national means, such as political, economic, and information programs, with its military efforts. For its part, the Nepalese COIN campaign from 1996 to 2006 overemphasized the enemy-centric approach and failed to defeat the insurgency because it did not integrate all available national resources. This thesis finds that the mixed approach must be balanced and blended with other important factors, such as information operations, diplomatic measures, and international aspects, because no developing countries operate in isolation. They are deeply influenced by their global strategic position, external players, and the strategic interests of their neighbors. Thus, the insights gained here are intended to support further analysis of the larger scope of the COIN campaign in India and Nepal to find an approach that is even more effective.