Ballistic Missile Defense and National Defense Strategy - Striking a Balance Between Defense, Cost and Risk

摘要

Spending multi-billions of dollars to develop and deploy a national Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system with a limited capability against an accidental or rogue actor launch does not satisfy the defense policy goals or the strategic framework as defined in either the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) or the recently published 2002 National Security Strategy for the United States. At best, this limited national system provides a marginal defense that is easily defeated by rudimentary and readily available countermeasures. But even worst, it is incapable of defeating the most likely Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile threats - non-missile delivery means of WMD against the U.S. and a short to medium range missile attack against our deployed forces or our allies. This is not the capabilities-based defensive strategy that defeats how will verses how might the enemy fight. Its does not mitigate the risk associated with balancing present and future defense requirements like recapitalization, modernization, transformation, and homeland security. Nor does it fulfill our defense policy goals of assuring allies and friends, dissuading future military competition, deterring threats or decisively defeating our adversary should deterrence fail. The nation cannot allow the tragedy of 11 September 2001 to unduly influence our BMD effort and deploy a national system that creates a false sense of security. Even the affluent United States as the current world hegemon cannot afford everything. Tough times require equally tough and smart decisions. The purpose of this paper is to assess recent decisions and using the 2001 QDR defense policy goals and strategic framework to propose how the military might best employ BMD systems in defense of the United States, its deployed forces and its allies without creating unnecessary risk elsewhere.