Leveraging Logical Lines of Operation in COIN

摘要

Historically, the U.S. Army has faced numerous challenges when planning for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Insurgencies by their very nature occur within the context of a complex operating environment and typically last years, if not decades. The insurgency that erupted at the conclusion of major combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom represents an example of the complex operating environment that planners will continue to face in the future. The best available planning method for operational planners to frame operations over the duration of a protracted campaign is called Logical Lines of Operation. Logical Lines of Operation allows commanders to visualize and adjust operations over time, space, and purpose to contribute to operational objectives and strategic end-state(s). This monograph analyzes the theoretical and historical underpinnings of Lines of Operation (physical and logical) and counterinsurgency operations (COIN). An analysis of U.S. and British planning and counterinsurgency doctrine provides a look at the effectiveness of current doctrine in addressing the use of Logical Lines of Operation in the complex operating environment. Case studies are analyzed to examine the practical application of Logical Lines of Operation in COIN operations and to determine whether the concept informs current doctrine. The author argues that a void exists in both U.S. Army and Joint doctrine with respect to the use of Logical Lines of Operation, particularly with respect to planning COIN operations within protracted campaigns. He presents recommendations to improve the description and depiction of Logical Lines of Operation in U.S. Joint and Army planning and counterinsurgency doctrine.