Salary Auctions and Matching as Incentives for Recruiting to Positions that are Hard to Fill in the Norwegian Armed Forces

摘要

A significant number of positions in the Norwegian Armed Forces that are open for assignment are not filled because they do not receive any qualified applicants. Over the last five years, more than 30 percent of the announced job vacancies have been unfilled. This thesis explores two different areas of research to help remedy this situation: auction theory and assignment market mechanisms. Auction theory and assignment market theory and practice are examined to reveal how these mechanisms might provide incentives to improve the quality of military assignments. The research finds that both of these mechanisms fall short when used independently. Auction theory is problematic when both sides of the market have preferences over the outcome; assignment models are problematic when there are system-level concerns about which jobs remain unfilled. This thesis introduces a hybrid solution, containing elements of both auction theory and assignment markets, which has the potential to improve the current matching process. This research is intended to improves knowledge and understanding about both of these research areas, and their interactions.