Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO): Tactical Successes Mired in Organizational Chaos; Roadblock in the Counter-IED Fight.

摘要

The United States Department of Defense (DoD) estimates that Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) are responsible for almost 50% of the casualties (both mortal and injured) sustained in Iraq and nearly 30% of those sustained in Afghanistan since the start of combat operations. Furthermore, in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Iraqi Enduring Freedom (OEF), deaths from IEDs have steadily increased since the cessation of major combat operations in 2003. As a result of the staggering losses inflicted by these devices, defeating this terrorist tactic has become a top priority for the DoD. The American public is swayed by many things, but none more convincingly than nightly news reports of U.S. casualties from IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan. To win the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT), bureaucrats and warriors alike must harness the nation's ingenuity and resources to defeat this terrorist weapon, which threatens to diminish national will in the fight for freedom. Given the magnitude of the IED threat, the Secretary of Defense created the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to address this problem in February, 2006. JIEDDO is chartered to 'focus' (lead, advocate, coordinate) all DoD actions in support of the Combatant Commanders' and their respective Joint Task Forces' efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence. However, JIEDDO, as an organization, possesses neither the structure nor the authority to effectively prosecute the war against IEDs. As a large, bureaucratic organization rooted in the technological approach to defeating IEDs, JIEDDO lacks the agility to quickly react to a changing enemy and has no legal authority to compel other DoD entities to act. This paper analyzes JIEDDO by reviewing its origins, examining its current structure and authority, and identifying recommendations that may improve its ability to defeat IEDs.