IPB: Predicting an Unpredictable Enemy Why We do it. Why the S2 can't do it. That the Staff Should

摘要

The purpose of this study is to determine why intelligence officers acting as battalion S-2 have difficulty predicting the enemy. It hypothesizes that two causes: lack of experience of the principal officers conducting IPB and inadequate emphasis on the staff's role in IPB have cascading effects that prevent staffs and commanders from mastering the planning process (which inevitable effects execution). The study explores several fundamental questions. First, why predict at all. It attempts to answer this question through a study of the neurology of prediction as it relates to action and thinking. Three major sources are used to support the study's findings. These include the studies of Jeff Hawkins, the founder of Palm Pilot and a student of neuroscience from his book On Intelligence; Richard Heuer, a social psychologist that works for the CIA from his work The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis; and Abraham Maslow, the renowned psychologist from his work A Theory of Human Motivation. Second, the study researches why the military is so connected to action. This is accomplished through a survey of the Army's Doctrine both past and present. Next the study answers why some predict better than others. The study shows how our current manning methodology for S-2s at the battalion and brigade level is flawed.