Operation Iraqi Freedom and Logistics Transformation

摘要

U.S. Army transformation strategy addresses the continuing imperative to change the Army from a Cold War design. Army Logistics transformation has been pursuing five strategies as part of this transformation. One of these key transformational strategies is Distribution- Based Logistics (DBL). This concept is a fundamental departure from the logistics doctrine the Army used in Operation Desert Storm. After units returned from the Gulf War, the Army and the Department of Defense reviewed the lessons learned, concluding that even though the war had been a success there were many things that needed to be improved. DoD and the Army noted that future enemies would not give the United States 6 months to build a base before attacking. Therefore, strategic mobility and the theater logistics process had to be more responsive. In the logistics arena, four overarching problems were identified: Logistics Force Reception, Limited Logistics Communications, Shortage of Ground Transportation Assets, and Theater Distribution Difficulties. Over the last 15 years, reforms of these four areas of concern have become the foundation in one form or another for DoD's and the Army's logistical transformation concepts. The DBL concept was first used in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). DBL is designed to reduce the size of the logistical footprint by providing equal or better capability through better distribution rather than having units carry large stockpiles of supplies. In effect, it swaps warehousing capacity for frequent, reliable flows of supplies. This was how logistical support for OIF combat operations and the first few months of subsequent stability operations worked. This SRP assesses the performance of this new logistics paradigm during the combat phase of OIF, noting its impact on Army logistical transformation. It concludes with recommendations for improving DBL, and explains how the on-going Army logistical transformation can benefit from the lessons of OIF.