Improving Acquisition Outcomes: Organizational and Management Issues.

摘要

Despite years of change and reform, DoD continues to develop and acquire weapon systems that it cannot afford and cannot deliver on schedule. The U.S. Government Accountability Office reported, for example, that research and development costs in 2008 for selected major programs were 42 percent higher than originally estimated and that the average delay in delivering initial capabilities had increased to 22 months (March 2009, p. 1). Also, William Lynn, the new Deputy Secretary of Defense, stated that it will be very difficult to sustain a force large enough to meet demands if current acquisition trends continue. This suggests that the new administration will have to find ways to halt traditional cost growth associated with fielding new capabilities -- or consider program terminations (Lynn, 2009, p. 16). Many of the problems that contribute to poor cost and schedule outcomes are systemic to the way that the acquisition process is organized and managed in DoD. It is our purpose in this paper to discuss a few of these problems and how they may be contributing to inefficiency and unrealistic expectations. These issues include the following: (1) the service chiefs' role in the acquisition process, (2) the combatant commands' (COCOMs') role in the requirements process, (3) the impact of joint duty requirements on the acquisition process, and (4) a growing emphasis on management processes at the expense of workforce initiative.