In Search of Post-Soviet Operational Art: A Case Study in Russian Military Operations in the North Caucasus Since 1991

摘要

The formative post-Soviet Russian military experiences at the operational level were the wars with Chechnya from 1994-1996 and 1999-2000. Strategic and tactical transformations that took place between the two wars have shaped Russian operational art in the post-Soviet era. In fighting a counterinsurgency, Russia will seek to fight a conventional war against its opponent. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian state and military struggled to maintain its identity and dominance in the region. Movement toward independence by separatist regions threatened Russian internal stability and security. As a result, the Russian military and security ministries were employed to quell the Islamist separatist movement taking place on its southern border and to regain political control of Chechnya. The complete military failure in the first of two Chechen wars led to major strategic and operational changes in the interwar period. Conclusion: Evidence from the two wars suggests there is a post-Soviet form of operational art; however, it is not uniquely post-Soviet. Rather, it is a continuation of the czarist tradition that began to emerge in the early 20th century and was shaped in the framework of Soviet military academia. In the end, taking in to consideration the improvements in joint warfighting, command and control, intelligence, force protection, fires, maneuver and logistics, Russia will fight to its strengths using conventional warfare to fight a counterinsurgency.