Critical Analysis of Robert E. Lee's Campaign Plan for a Second Northern Invasion

摘要

Prior to invading Pennsylvania, General Robert E. Lee identified the North's center of gravity as the will of the northern populace to continue the war in an effort to preserve the Union. However, if he could not affect the North's ability to make war, then he would have to devise a plan to affect the North's will to perpetuate the Civil War. Influenced by his earlier victories, Lee overestimated his capabilities, the abilities of his commanders to discern commander's intent and underestimated their need for guidance on strategic endstate. Lee's hopes that his audacious actions could produce a profound effect on the will of the northern populace to maintain the Union and sway the Federal government and military to capitulate was based on assumption wrought with flaws. A combination of mistakes prior to and during his march north led to the Confederate General's failure to link what he wanted to achieve tactically and operationally, to how he saw victory for the Confederacy strategically in a second Northern campaign.