REWARD STRUCTURE AND INFORMATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATION IN REWARD TWO-PERSON, TWO-CHOICE GAMES

摘要

This study investigated the development of cooperation in three types of matrix games:a bargaining game, a trust game (a Prisoner x Dilemma Game), and a mixed game (in which the incentives to ccoperate and to compete are equated). In addition, the effects of four levels of information were investigated in each type of game. The four levels were:(1) Minimal (non-social). Players were told simply that they must, on each trial, select one of two possible responses and they would then must, on each trial, select one of two possible responses and they would then receive a score. (2) Own Pay-off known (non-social). This condition is identical with the one just described except that the two choices available to him (3) Other’s presence known. The only difference between (2) and (3) is that here each player is informed that the particular score he receives of the two possible ones for each of his possible responses is determined by the behavior of another player. (4)Full information. Here each player is shown the full matrix and the consequences of each response combination are explained in detail