Ballistic Missile Defense and Deceptive Basing: A New Calculus for the Defense of ICBMs

摘要

Given the advantages and disadvantages of defending deceptively based ICBMs, the delay in getting SALT II ratified, and the potential for SALT failure, what is the best course of action for the United States today. Five alternatives are examined: (1) Continue to participate in the SALT process; (2) Deploy deceptively based, defendable, ICBMs; (3) Modify ABM Treaty; (4) Accelerate development of rapidly deployable, mobile, compatible BMD; and (5) Respond to SALT failure with mix of shelters, ICBMs, and BMD. The quantitative analyses of this monograph serve to illustrate and validate the fundamental concept that preferential defense can economically contribute to the survivability of deceptively based weapons systems. This concept can be applied to ICBMs, with the result that the leverage advantage shifts in favor of the strategic defense. Specifically, the Soviets, in the first strike, can be made to expend more RVs than they destroy. Thus, the incentive for a first strike is diminished and deterrence is enhanced. Defended ICBMs can survive, should deterrence fail, in numbers large enough to preclude military and subsequent political intimidation from an adventurous Soviet regime. These potent defensive concepts demand full consideration by our strategic planners as they seek to insure United States national security and preserve the strategic balance.