Comparative Look at Air-Ground Support Doctrine and Practice in World War II

摘要

This study summarizes the air-ground support doctrine and systems employed by both the Allies and their adversaries in World War II. It is intended to identify similarities and differences in the doctrinal and procedural systems employed by the combatants; it is in no sense a complete historical study of air-ground operations during the war. The value of the study lies in its narrow focus on a specific application of air power and in its comparative examination of this application. This approach helps us to understand that, as of 1939, close air support for ground combat forces was a tactic universally discussed by the military powers but not universally accepted and practiced until after the war. At the onset of the war, only the Germans had developed a doctrine and a procedural system for close air support. The Russians and the Japanese had a doctrinal base, but lacked the integrating procedures necessary to convert doctrine into practice. Italy and France had neither doctrine nor procedures for substantive close air support. In the case of the United States and Great Britain, prewar debate and doctrine tended to inhibit development of close air support. Once the war began, battlefield requirements forced change. Despite their different starting points, by war's end all major belligerents employed air-ground systems with some remarkably similar features. However, there were major differences between the U.S. and British systems and the German version. These similarities and differences are described in this paper. The appendix describes current Soviet close air support doctrine.