COIN: Is Current Doctrine Counterfeit.

摘要

While the outcome of the Iraq war seems to have validated the U.S. Army's counterinsurgency manual FM 3-24, the war in Afghanistan seems to indicate there are fundamental problems associated with its historical principles and concepts. Dr. Kilcullen and Dr. Gorka asserted in a recent Joint Forces Quarterly article that the Army has relied on an incomplete set of examples to form current COIN doctrine. To evaluate their claim, this monograph answers two questions. First, do Gorka and Kilcullen accurately describe the defects in the Army COIN doctrine's development, and, second, does the failure to study examples of civil wars and revolutions matter. Answering these questions required an examination of past and present U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine to determine which doctrinal tenets were transferred from one document to the next, to compare historical examples used in previous doctrine and current doctrine, and to determine whether current COIN doctrine lacks examples of civil wars and revolutions. To answer the second question, it was necessary to select and examine recent civil wars. The civil wars in Burundi and Mozambique proved useful for answering that question because the warring parties involved exhibited characteristics not addressed in current doctrine. The research showed that current COIN doctrine failed to study civil wars and is limited to a select group of typical counterinsurgency examples. Current U.S. Army COIN doctrine is not comprehensive enough to address the many contextual situations surrounding the multiple examples of civil wars, revolutions, and insurgencies around the world. The claims of Gorka and Kilcullen are valid and would benefit from further examination.