NATO's (North Atlantic Treaty Organization's) Theater Nuclear Weapons and the Defense of Europe: Past Patterns and Future Prospects

摘要

The goal of this research was to analyze and order the controversy and ambiguity surrounding the TNW modernization started by NATO in 1979. To place the GLCM/Pershing II deployment within its historical context, this thesis reviews significant events pertaining to NATO since its inception. Three basic questions guided this study: Why did the NATO allies agree in 1979 to modernize their theater nuclear force. Why did the United States actually begin this TNW deployment in 1983. Is the TNW program accomplishing its goals. The first period reviewed (1948-59) is considered in terms of the United States' initial deployment of TNWs into Europe, the Soviet force buildup following World War II, and the creation of NATO in 1949. Section two traces NATO's changing attitudes towards TNWs from 1960-1974. The third section (1975-present) discusses the conventional and nuclear force balance, NATO's growing divisions during this period, and the role of the GLCM/Pershing II deployment within this environment of change for NATO. An examination of NATO's patterns of response over the last 38 years reveals that NATO has failed to develop formal organizational goals, choosing instead to react to each Soviet provocation on a case-by-case basis.