Admiral Sharp, Air Power, and Victory: A Critical Analysis of Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect

摘要

This analysis examines the utility of Admiral U.S.G. Sharp's book, 'Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect,' as a guide to the future employment of air power in a limited war. Admiral Sharp asserts that by showing how U.S. air power was misused in Vietnam he can justify its utility in future wars. The first part of the analysis examines Admiral Sharp's conclusions using the works of Carl von Clausewitz ('On War') and Sun Tzu ('The Art of War') to determine their theoretical validity as basic principles applicable to air power. The second part of the analysis examines Admiral Sharp's conclusions about the effectiveness of air power by reviewing the results of air actions in World War II, Korea, as well as Vietnam. The analysis concludes that Admiral Sharp's book is not a useful guide to future air power employment.