Haversack Ruse, and British Deception Operations in Palestine During World War I

摘要

British deception operations in Palestine during World War I, and in particularthe Haversack Ruse used in preparation for the third battle for Gaza, represent a modern revival of the use of deception in war. General Sir Edmund Allenby, the British commander in Palestine, conceived of and planned his two major operations, Gaza and Megiddo, with deception as an integral part. His success against Turkish-German armies in each was due, in large part, to his creative and thorough operational deception plans. Allenby's use of deception provides an excellent example because World War I represents one of the first modern wars, with regard to technology. and techniques that we still use today. Using the two successful major deception operations and one unsuccessful attempt at strategic deception as examples, I have derived the basic elements, advantages and limitations of deception. I found the elements of deception to be: good intelligence and security; knowledge of your enemy's perceptions and expectations; deception and operational planning integration; adequate time to both plan and execute operational deception; air superiority or the ability to control your enemy's reconnaissance of your forces; and creativity in blending these elements into a clever and innovative plan. Deception's advantages are its low cost, that it is difficult for your enemy to counter, and the surprise it gives you over your enemy. The limitations of deception are that it is not a panacea, that you still need adequate force to win in battle, and that you must have good enough intelligence feedback to know if your enemy has accepted your deceptive picture.