Emergence of Operational Art in the Great Sioux War 1876-1877

摘要

The Sioux War of 1876-1877 was the largest campaign of the late- nineteenth century Indian Wars. This conflict grew out of the desire of the United States Government to resolve confusing territorial claims to the Black Hills and the 'unceded territories' of the Powder and Yellowstone River valleys. The numerous and fierce Lakota and their northern Cheyenne allies controlled these areas and drove out rival Indian tribes and the United States Army in the late 1860s, and established dominance in the region. The Division of the Missouri, led by Lieutenant General Philip Sheridan, had developed a successful concept to defeat the tribes of the southern plains from 1867 to 1873 that used converging columns, winter expeditions, and attacks against Indian stores and possessions to catch the Indians when they were least mobile. Sheridan's initial campaign plan against the Lakota and their allies used this same concept, but failed to develop an operational approach that linked tactical actions to the strategic objective. His initial plan used against the Lakota and Cheyenne embraced the tactics of the southern plains in an environment and against a massed enemy for which they were disastrously ill-suited, and resulted in a string of defeats that culminated in the Battle of the Little Big Horn.