Arab-Israeli War October 1973: Lessons Learned, Lessons Forgotten

摘要

The Arab-Israeli War in October 1973 holds many operational lessons for U.S.forces. The October War (called the 'Yom Kippur War' by the Israelis and the 'Ramadan War' by the Arabs) began on 6 October 1973. It lasted for some 18 days and was marked by violent tank battles, air warfare, skirmishes at sea and heavy artillery attacks. Infantry forces on both sides played a major role. Nearly 13,000 soldiers, sailors and airmen died during the conflict, the most recent of the major Arab-Israeli wars. Coming just six years after the 'Six Day War' in 1967, each side was affected by that brief encounter. The Israeli conduct in 1973 was largely based on successes in 1967. Badly mistaken in that they failed to account for Arabian changes in operations and tactics, the IDF was very nearly beaten in the first forty-eight hours of battle. Operational lessons can be taken from this simple premise: Never assume that any future opponent has accepted the status quo imposed upon him on the basis of past operational victories. Discussion here focuses on those combat lessons learned as well as mistakes made in the Israeli Intelligence estimates of the prewar environment. It is also submitted that there exists a disconnect between the Israeli National Strategy for its armed forces and the employment of its military might. The United States must also guard against this disconnect given the massive military draw-down without lessening military commitments around the world.