Phylogenetic inference and the writings of Karl Popper

摘要

Four papers (de Queiroz and Poe; Kluge; Faith and Trueman; Farris et al.) in this volume of Systematic Biology deal with Karl Popper's writings on the philosophy of science and the relation of those writings to methods of phylogenetic inference. Popper is well-known for espousing a scientific logic or philosophy in which primacy was given to falsification, that is, the search for data that contradict or "falsify" a hypothesis, over verification, the search for data that support or "verify" a hypothesis. One context in which the debate surrounding the application of philosophical principles to phylogenetic research can be framed takes the following form: Should falsification (e.g., minimizing the number of false assumptions of homology among traits for a given hypothesis of phylogeny) be the sine qua non for accepting a phylogenetic hypothesis, or should some form of verification (e.g., the optimal confirmation of the data at hand, given a hypothesis of phylogeny) be accepted as the foundation for phylogenetic inference? In Popper's writings, the concept of falsification was linked to another concept he called corroboration. It is this linkage that is the subject of the series of papers in this issue.