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Position-based quantum cryptography over untrusted networks

机译:不可信网络上基于位置的量子密码学

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摘要

In this article, we propose quantum position verification (QPV) schemes where all the channels are untrusted except the position of the prover and distant reference stations of verifiers. We review and analyze the existing QPV schemes containing some pre-shared data between the prover and verifiers. Most of these schemes are based on non-cryptographic assumptions, i.e. quantum/classical channels between the verifiers are secure. It seems impractical in an environment fully controlled by adversaries and would lead to security compromise in practical implementations. However, our proposed formula for QPV is more robust, secure and according to the standard assumptions of cryptography. Furthermore, once the position of the prover is verified, our schemes establish secret keys in parallel and can be used for authentication and secret communication between the prover and verifiers.
机译:在本文中,我们提出了量子位置验证(QPV)方案,该方案中除了证明者和验证者的遥远参考站的位置之外,所有通道都不可信。我们审查和分析现有的QPV方案,其中包含在证明方和验证方之间的一些预共享数据。这些方案中的大多数都是基于非加密假设的,即验证者之间的量子/经典通道是安全的。在完全由对手控制的环境中,这似乎是不切实际的,并且会导致实际实施中的安全性受损。但是,根据密码学的标准假设,我们为QPV提出的公式更加健壮,安全。此外,一旦证明者的位置得到验证,我们的方案将并行建立秘密密钥,并可用于证明者和验证者之间的身份验证和秘密通信。

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