(1291-6530-1-PB)A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH FOR THE OPTIMAL INVESTMENT DECISIONS OF GREEN INNOVATION IN A MANUFACTURER-RETAILER SUPPLY CHAIN

摘要

With increasing consumers’ awareness of eco-friendly products, Manufactures and Retailers are proactive to invest in greeninnovation. This paper analyzes a single manufacturer, single retailer supply chain where both participants are engaged ingreen innovation investment. Consumer demand is dependent on selling price and investment level of green innovation. Weconsider the effects of consumer environmental awareness, perception difficulty of green products, and degree of goods’necessity on decision making. According to the relationship between the manufacturer and the retailer, three non-coordinatedgame (including Manufacturer-Stackelberg, Retailer-Stackelberg, and Vertical Nash) and one coordinated supply chainstructures are proposed. The pricing and investment level of green innovation are investigated under these four supply chainstructures, respectively. A Retail Fixed Markup policy is analyzed when channel members fail to achieve supply chaincoordination. The effects of RFM on supply chain performance are evaluated. We numerically compare optimal solutions andprofits under the coordination, the Manufacturer-Stackelberg, and the Retail Fixed Markup supply chain structure andprovide managerial insights for practitioners.