Why Grant I-Deals? Supervisors' Prior I-Deals, Exchange Ideology, and Justice Sensitivity

摘要

Supervisors often have knowledge of their subordinates' characteristics, needs, and performance and thus play an important role in the authorization and implementation of idiosyncratic deals (I-deals). By adopting a supervisor-based perspective of I-deals and using the logic of appropriateness in decision-making as the theoretical framework, the study examines managers' motives for authorizing I-deals. Specifically, we argue that supervisors are more likely to grant I-deals when they have received I-deals themselves in the past and that this relationship is moderated by supervisors' exchange ideology. We also propose that supervisors will be less likely to authorize I-deals when they have low or high levels (compared to moderate levels) of justice sensitivity. Results from 182 supervisor-subordinate dyads from various organizations suggest a positive and linear relationship between supervisors' I-deals and subordinates' I-deals and a moderation effect of exchange ideology. Furthermore, results show an inverted U-shaped relationship between supervisors' justice sensitivity and subordinates' I-deals. This research expands our understanding of factors affecting supervisors' decision making on I-deals authorization.