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首页> 外文期刊>AJOB Primary Research >Understanding What Participants in Empirical Bioethical Studies Mean: Historical Cautions From William James and Ludwig Wittgenstein
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Understanding What Participants in Empirical Bioethical Studies Mean: Historical Cautions From William James and Ludwig Wittgenstein

机译:理解经验生物伦理学研究者的含义:威廉·詹姆斯和路德维希·维特根斯坦的历史谨慎

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摘要

Methods from psychology are informing much empirical research in bioethics by helping to understand the thoughts, feelings, and beliefs of people as they relate to a variety of bioethical issues. This can lead to improvements in practice or policy only if the subjective mental states under study have been characterized accurately. In this article, I describe two cautions from the history of psychology concerning the accurate characterization of mental states that have significant implications for how we elicit and interpret data in empirical bioethical studies. Both make reference to tendencies of mind that can be difficult to combat and that are the cause of other more specific methodological errors. The first historical caution, William James's "psychologist's fallacy," warns against substituting the ethicist/researcher's point of view with that of the person under study. Failure to appreciate this essentially egocentric bias can result in asking people to report on things (e.g., probability of benefit from an experimental therapy) that are not a part of the person's experience in the same way they are a part of the researcher's worldview. The responses the person provides in such cases do not provide good information about his or her experience and so cannot be used to guide sound policy. The second historical caution is Wittgenstein's discursive perspective, which urges us to interpret the meaning of things said by a person in a research study by examining the function each utterance serves for the person. For example, one should avoid assuming that people respond to queries about understanding by simply describing their understanding. Instead, research participants might provide responses to achieve other goals, such as establishing a desired attitude in themselves. I suggest that both cautions can be addressed through careful qualitative investigation at the beginning of a research project.
机译:心理学的方法通过帮助人们理解与各种各样的生物伦理学问题相关的思想,感情和信仰,正在为许多生物伦理学的实证研究提供信息。仅在正确描述了所研究的主观心理状态之后,这才能导致实践或政策上的改善。在本文中,我描述了心理学历史上有关精神状态准确表征的两个警告,这些警告对我们在经验生物伦理学研究中如何引出和解释数据具有重要意义。两者都提到了难以克服的精神倾向,这是其他更具体的方法错误的原因。历史上的第一个警告是威廉·詹姆斯(William James)的“心理学家的谬误”,警告不要将伦理学家/研究者的观点替换为研究对象的观点。无法理解这种本质上以自我为中心的偏见可能会导致要求人们以与研究者的世界观相同的方式报告与经历无关的事物(例如,从实验疗法中受益的可能性)。在这种情况下,此人提供的回复不能提供有关其经历的良好信息,因此不能用来指导合理的政策。历史上的第二个警告是维特根斯坦的话语视角,它敦促我们通过研究每个话语对人的作用来解释人在研究中所说的事物的含义。例如,应该避免假设人们只是通过简单描述自己的理解来回应对理解的质疑。相反,研究参与者可能会提供响应以实现其他目标,例如在自己身上建立理想的态度。我建议可以在研究项目开始时通过仔细的定性研究来解决这两种警告。

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