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An industry structured for unsafety? An exploration of the cost-safety conundrum in construction project delivery

机译:一个完全的行业,适用于无休止周期? 建筑项目交付成本安全难题的探索

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摘要

Construction accidents can have major social, financial, reputational and legal implications. Hence, it is to be expected that safety is often presented as a key priority for construction organisations. However, existing evidence suggests that within the construction industry, safety often loses the battle when a trade-off is required with project cost. Improved understanding of the manifestations of the cost and safety interaction are needed. A three-year longitudinal study afforded the opportunity to investigate the safety implications of sub-economic bids on a large infrastructure project in the UK. While low-bidding to win tenders is not new, this paper presents empirical evidence of the consequential safety risk implications of such bidding at the project delivery stage. Faced with a perverse form of the tender 'Winner's Curse' where the successful bid is frequently the lowest, cost-saving strategies are often implemented to recoup lost pricing margins. Our investigation revealed several instances of consequentially elevated safety risks, through cheaper and poor-quality equipment, machinery and temporary structures. In addition, lower-paid migrant workers - who already experience a statistically greater safety risk than local workers - were employed on the project without appropriate investment in a safety management approach suitable for a multinational workforce. The study both contributes to the call to critically rethink the construction industry's competitive bidding practices, and highlights an industry structure that creates the conditions for high safety risks and accidents.
机译:建设事故可以具有重大的社会,财务,良好和法律影响。因此,预计安全性通常呈现为施工组织的关键优先级。然而,现有证据表明,在建筑行业内,在需要项目成本时,安全经常会失去战斗。需要改进对成本和安全互动的表现的理解。为期三年的纵向研究,有机会调查亚经济竞标对英国大型基础设施项目的安全影响。虽然低竞争者赢得招标并不是新的,但本文提出了在项目交付阶段此类竞标的后果安全风险影响的经验证据。面对招标“获奖者的诅咒”的反向形式,其中成功出价频繁是最低,节省成本的策略,通常实施,以收回损失定价利润率。我们的调查揭示了几种情况下,安全风险,通过更便宜,劣质的设备,机械和临时结构。此外,低收入的移民工人 - 在没有适合跨国劳动力的安全管理办法的情况下,在项目中雇用了比当地工人的统计上更大的安全风险。这项研究既有助于批评建筑行业竞标实践的呼吁,突出了一个为高安全风险和事故创造条件的行业结构。

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