Knowledge-Sharing Reward Dynamics in Knowledge Management Systems: Game Theory-Based Empirical Validation

摘要

There are several knowledge-sharing problems in knowledge-management system (KMS) contexts. Many organizations use rewards to motivate people to contribute knowledge, but there has been no conclusive evidence of the role of reward. We designed two game-theory models to explain why and how the different knowledge-sharing problems occur in a KMS and the effectiveness of rewards. We found that there are four types of Nash equilibriums in different knowledge-sharing situations (Perfect, Free-riding, Non-use, and Dormant). Complex situations also occur (e.g., the absence of consideration for knowledge quality leads to vicious cycles). People contribute low-quality knowledge that is not used, and thus the KMS spirals toward disuse. To provide proposition evidence, a case study in an enterprise resource planning vendor was conducted. Based on comparison with empirical evidence, proposition validity was ensured. To effectively facilitate knowledge sharing, our suggestion is that organizations not only add rewards but also apply some additional mechanisms, such as a quality-evaluating system, extended information technology support, and organizational policy.