Programme Management in Afghanistan -A New Approach to Post-Conflict Reconstruction?

摘要

WHEN I was offered the chance to serve alongside the United States Marine Corps in Afghanistan, it seemed like an opportunity not to be missed. I was to be one of a small number of British staff embedded within HQ Regional Command (South West) (RC(SW)), the newly formed headquarters which was to take responsibility for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Helmand and Nimroz Provinces. As with any new venture, for an initial period things were in a state of flux. This was what had appealed; the opportunity to influence and shape things before the situation "set". The Commanding General, Major General Richard Mills USMC, had established three Lines of Operation: Security, Governance and Development. Although not given the same emphasis initially, another vital element of the mission was the development of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), both the Police and the Army. Indeed, this task was critical. The strategic objective of "Transition" could not be achieved until ANSF capability had been raised to a level that could match whatever remained of the diminishing insurgency once the ISAF mission was substantively complete.