A Schelling model with switching agents: decreasing segregation via random allocation and social mobility

摘要

We study the behaviour of a Schelling-class system in which a fraction f of spatially-fixed switching agents is introduced. This new model allows for multiple interpretations, including: (i) random, non-preferential allocation (e.g. by housing associations) of given, fixed sites in an open residential system, and (ii) superimposition of social and spatial mobility in a closed residential system. We find that the presence of switching agents in a segregative Schelling-type dynamics can lead to the emergence of intermediate patterns (e.g. mixture of patches, fuzzy interfaces) as the ones described in [E. Hatna, I. Benenson, J. Artif. Soc. Social. Simul. 15, 6 (2012)]. We also investigate different transitions between segregated and mixed phases both at f = 0 and along lines of increasing f, where the nature of the transition changes.