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Optimal Decision of Different Fair Reference Points in Supply Chain under “Farmer-Supermarket Direct-Purchase” Mode

机译:“农—超市直购”模式下供应链中不同公平参考点的最优决策

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In a two-echelon “Farmer-Supermarket Direct-Purchase” supply chain composed of a supermarket and a farmer, the dominant supermarket used the Nash equilibrium solution and the Shapley value as the fair reference points. By constructing the Stackelberg game model, this paper analyzed the influence of supermarket’s fairness preference on the operation of supply chains and made a sensitivity analysis. The research indicates that supermarket’s fairness preference decreases order prices and the effort level of farmer increases the utility of the supermarket but reduces the income of the farmer. No matter whether the Nash equilibrium solution or the Shapley value is used as the fair reference point of the supermarket, the supply chain cannot be achieved coordination. However, the supply chain can be improved with the Shapley value as the fair reference point. Thus, the farmer, the supermarket and the supply chain tend to use Shapley value as a fairness reference point for the supermarket.
机译:在由超市和农户组成的两级“农民-超市直接购买”供应链中,占主导地位的超市使用纳什均衡解和Shapley值作为公平的参考点。通过构建Stackelberg博弈模型,分析了超市公平偏好对供应链运作的影响,并进行了敏感性分析。研究表明,超市的公平偏好降低了订单价格,农民的努力水平提高了超市的效用,但降低了农民的收入。无论将纳什均衡解还是Shapley值用作超级市场的​​公平参考点,都无法实现供应链的协调。但是,可以将Shapley值作为公平的参考点来改善供应链。因此,农民,超市和供应链倾向于将Shapley值用作超市的公平性参考点。

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