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首页> 外文期刊>Transportation Science >Interactions and Equilibrium Between Rescheduling Train Traffic and Routing Passengers in Microscopic Delay Management: A Game Theoretical Study
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Interactions and Equilibrium Between Rescheduling Train Traffic and Routing Passengers in Microscopic Delay Management: A Game Theoretical Study

机译:微观延迟管理中重新安排火车交通与路由乘客之间的互动与均衡:游戏理论研究

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摘要

In the last decade, optimization models for railway traffic rescheduling mostly focused on incorporating an increasing detail of the infrastructure, with the goal of proving feasibility and quality from the point of view of the managers of the infrastructure (tracks and stations). Different approaches that manage only the passenger flows instead focus more explicitly on the quality of service perceived by the passengers. This paper investigates microscopic railway traffic optimization models and algorithms, merging these two streams of research. In particular, we analyze the characterization of an equilibrium point between the reordering choices of train dispatchers in railway traffic optimization and the route choice of passengers in the available services of the railway transport network. We describe how passenger choice at stations along the route intertwines deeply with the problem of rescheduling trains over tracks and station resources in a very complicated setting that might not exhibit equilibrium points in general. Delaying trains and /or dropping passenger connections and/or giving particular route advice to passengers might influence the behavior of traffic controllers and passengers, determining a trade-off between the delays of trains, weighted by the passenger load, and the travel time of passengers. We study this problem with a game theoretical approach, focusing on the solutions corresponding to Nash equilibria of a game involving passengers and infrastructure managers. The proposed game theoretical approach is able to easily consider information and interdependence of the actions of multiple stakeholders. Computational results based on a real-world Dutch railway network quantify the trade-off between the minimization of train delays and passenger travel times and the performance, stability, and convergence of the equilibrium point given different algorithms and information available. The final aim of this work is to study the impact of effective implementations of railway traffic management and dissemination of information to passengers and operators.
机译:在过去的十年中,铁路交通重新安排的优化模型主要集中在纳入基础设施的增加细节,从基础设施管理人员(曲目和站)的角度来看,实现可行性和质量。不同的方法只管理乘客流动,而是更明确地关注乘客的服务质量。本文调查了微观铁路交通优化模型和算法,合并了这两种研究流。特别是,我们分析了铁路交通优化中火车调度员的重新排序选择之间的均衡点的表征,以及铁路运输网络的可用服务中的乘客的路线选择。我们描述了沿着路线沿着轨道和站资源的轨道和电台资源的问题在可能没有展示平衡点的情况下涉及轨道和站资源的问题,这是如何深入的。延迟列车和/或丢弃乘客联系和/或为乘客提供特定路线建议可能会影响交通管制员和乘客的行为,确定乘客负荷加权的列车延迟之间的权衡,以及乘客的旅行时间。我们通过游戏理论方法研究了这个问题,专注于对应于涉及乘客和基础设施管理者的游戏的纳什均衡的解决方案。拟议的游戏理论方法能够轻松考虑多个利益相关者的行为的信息和相互依存。基于真实世界的荷兰铁路网络的计算结果量化了火车延迟和乘客旅行时间的最小化与均衡点的性能,稳定性和收敛之间的折衷所赋予的不同算法和可用的信息。这项工作的最终目标是研究有效实施的铁路交通管理和传播信息对乘客和运营商的影响。

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