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Experimental evolution of selfish policing in social bacteria

机译:社会细菌自私警务的实验演变

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Cooperative organisms evolve within socially diverse populations. In populations harboring both cooperators and cheaters, cooper-ators might adapt by evolving novel interactions with either social type or both. Diverse animal traits suppress selfish behaviors when cooperation is important for fitness, but the potential for prokar-yotes to evolve such traits is unclear. We allowed a strain of the bacterium Myxococcus xanthus that is proficient at cooperative fruiting body development to evolve while repeatedly encountering a non-evolving developmental cheater. Evolving populations greatly increased their fitness in the presence of the cheater, both relative to their ancestor and in terms of absolute spore productivity. However, the same evolved lineages exhibited a net disadvantage to the ancestor in the cheater's absence. Evolving populations reversed a large ancestral disadvantage to the cheater into competitive superiority and also evolved to strongly suppress cheater productivity. Moreover, in three-party mixes with the cheater, evolved populations enhanced their ancestor's productivity relative to mixes of only the ancestor and cheater. Thus, our evolved populations function as selfish police that inhibit cheaters, both to their own advantage and to the benefit of others as well. Cheater suppression was general across multiple unfamiliar cheaters but was more pronounced against the evolutionarily familiar cheater. Also, evolution generated three new mutually beneficial relationships, including complementary defect rescue between evolved cells and the selection-regime cheater. The rapid evolution of cheater suppression documented here suggests that coevolving social strategies within natural populations of prokaryotes are more diverse and complex than previously appreciated.
机译:合作生物在不同社会群体中发展。在既有合作者又有作弊者的人群中,合作者可能通过发展与社会类型或两者都有的新型互动来适应。当合作对于健身很重要时,各种动物性状会抑制自私的行为,但原核生物进化出这种性状的可能性尚不清楚。我们允许精通协作子实体发育的一种菌株粘球霉菌(X-Xanthus)进化,同时反复遇到一个不进化的发育作弊者。进化的种群在作弊者的存在下大大提高了他们的适应能力,相对于其祖先和绝对孢子生产力而言。但是,在没有作弊者的情况下,相同的进化谱系对祖先显示出净劣势。不断发展的种群将作弊者的巨大祖先劣势逆转为竞争优势,并且进化为强烈抑制作弊者的生产力。而且,在与骗子的三方混合中,相对于仅祖先和骗子的混合,进化后的种群提高了祖先的生产力。因此,我们不断发展的人口起着自私的警察的作用,既抑制骗子,也有利于自身和他人的利益。骗子的压制在多个不熟悉的作弊者中很普遍,但在进化上熟悉的作弊者中更为明显。同样,进化产生了三个新的互利关系,包括进化细胞与选择机制作弊者之间的互补缺陷挽救。此处记录的作弊者抑制的快速发展表明,原核生物自然种群内共同发展的社会策略比以前所认识的更加多样化和复杂。

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