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Should ride-sharing platforms cooperate with car-rental companies? Implications for consumer surplus and driver surplus

机译:乘坐共享平台是否应与汽车租赁公司合作? 对消费者盈余和司机盈余的影响

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摘要

The booming on-demand ride-sharing economy induces drivers who do or do not own cars to provide services on ride-sharing platforms. To meet growing demand, in practice the platforms have cooperated with car-rental companies that rent cars to without-car drivers to improve their supplies. However, this might harm the platforms, consumers, and drivers, since such a second capacity source may increase customers & rsquo; waiting time and reduce drivers & rsquo; utilization. In this paper, we study the impact of without car drivers in a car-rental company on a ride-sharing platform, consumer surplus, and driver surplus. The platform must decide whether to cooperate with the car-rental company, which entails a per-service price charged to customers and a per-service wage paid to (with-car and without-car) driver. In turn, the car-rental company charges without-car drivers who would like to provide services on the platform a price, and pays a commission rate to the platform. We analyze a stylized model in which customers decide whether to use the platform based on price and expected waiting time, and drivers base decisions about whether to work for the platform on wage and the probability of getting jobs. Driven by these two features, we find that the platform would prefer to cooperate with the car-rental company, and the optimal price and wage (profit) of the platform are not necessarily monotonic (increases) in the potential number of without-car drivers or the commission paid by the company. We also find that when the commission rate is high or the fixed payout ratio is low, cooperation can yield a win & ndash;win & ndash;win outcome for the platform, customers, and drivers. This provides a plausible explanation of why most ride-sharing platforms would cooperate with car-rental companies in practice. In addition, we find that such a win & ndash; win & ndash;win outcome can easily be achieved for a large customer size or delay cost but a small (with-car and without-car) driver size or service rate.(c) 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机译:蓬勃发展的按需乘车共享经济诱导驾驶员或不拥有汽车在乘车共享平台上提供服务。为了满足日益增长的需求,在实践中,该平台与汽车租赁公司合作,租用汽车到无车司机以改善其供应。但是,这可能会损害平台,消费者和司机,因为这样的第二个容量来源可能会增加客户和rsquo;等待时间和减少司机’利用率。在本文中,我们在乘车共享平台,消费者盈余和驾驶员盈余上研究没有汽车司机的影响。该平台必须决定是否与汽车租赁公司合作,该公司需要每次服务费用,为客户提供费用和支付给(带汽车和无车)驱动程序的每次服务工资。反过来,汽车租赁公司收取无需汽车司机的费用,他们希望在平台上提供服务,并向平台支付佣金率。我们分析了一个程式化的模型,客户决定是否根据价格和预期的等待时间使用该平台,以及关于是否为工资平台工作的驱动程序基本决策以及获得工作的概率。由这两个功能驱动,我们发现该平台宁愿与汽车租赁公司合作,平台的最佳价格和工资(利润)不一定在潜在数量的无车司机中单调(增加)或本公司支付的佣金。我们还发现,当佣金率很高或固定支付比率低时,合作可以产生Win&Ndash; Win&Ndash;赢得平台,客户和司机的结果。这提供了合理的解释,为什么大多数乘车共享平台在实践中与汽车租赁公司合作。此外,我们发现这样的WIN– Win&Ndash;对于大客户尺寸或延迟成本,可以轻松实现赢取结果,但小(带汽车和无车)驾驶员大小或服务率。(c)2020 Elsevier Ltd.保留所有权利。

著录项

  • 来源
    《Omega》 |2021年第7期|102309.1-102309.15|共15页
  • 作者单位

    Guangdong Univ Technol Sch Management Guangzhou 510520 Guangdong Peoples R China;

    South China Univ Technol Sch Business Adm Guangzhou 510640 Guangdong Peoples R China;

    Jinan Univ Sch Management Guangzhou 510632 Peoples R China;

    South China Univ Technol Sch Business Adm Guangzhou 510640 Guangdong Peoples R China;

    Dongguan Univ Technol Sch Econ & Management Dongguan 523808 Guangdong Peoples R China;

  • 收录信息
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    Ride-sharing platform; Pricing; Cross-side externalities; Sharing economy; Consumer surplus; Driver surplus;

    机译:乘坐共享平台;定价;交叉外部性;分享经济;消费者盈余;司机盈余;
  • 入库时间 2022-08-19 01:57:43

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