首页> 外文期刊>The Journal of real estate finance and economics >A Relook into the Impact of Divestitures in the Presence of Agency Conflicts: Evidence from Property Subsidiary Sell-Offs in China
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A Relook into the Impact of Divestitures in the Presence of Agency Conflicts: Evidence from Property Subsidiary Sell-Offs in China

机译:代理人存在下撤离的影响再思考:来自中国房地产子公司抛售的证据

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摘要

We analyze property subsidiary sell-offs in China to examine her market reaction to firms' divestiture decisions. Overall, the response from the stock market is neutral. However, detailed analysis reveals that the market reacts differently to property subsidiary sell-off announcements by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs. Consistent with findings from extant literature, we find statistically positive market returns associated with non-SOE sell-off announcements. However, we find statistically negative market returns associated with SOE sell-off announcements. We suggest that this divergent market reaction is influenced by the institutional feature of the Chinese market and is consistent with the high agency costs associated with state ownership.
机译:我们分析了中国房地产子公司的抛售,以考察其对公司资产剥离决定的市场反应。总体而言,股市的反应是中性的。但是,详细分析显示,市场对国有企业和非国有企业出售房地产子公司的公告反应不同。与现有文献的研究结果一致,我们发现与非国有企业抛售公告有关的市场正向统计回报也正。但是,我们发现与国有企业抛售公告相关的市场回报在统计上为负。我们认为,这种不同的市场反应受到中国市场制度特征的影响,并且与与国家所有制相关的高昂代理成本相一致。

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