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首页> 外文期刊>Corporate Board: Role, Duties & Composition >STATE OWNERSHIP, AGENCY CONFLICT AND EFFECTIVE TAX RATES: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA
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STATE OWNERSHIP, AGENCY CONFLICT AND EFFECTIVE TAX RATES: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA

机译:国家所有权,代理机构冲突和有效税率:来自中国的证据

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摘要

Agency conflict between minority and controlling shareholders in state owned firms has to be considered in order to examine the variability on effective tax rates. In China, state ownership helps the government to achieve its social objectives by optimizing corporate income tax. We provide a significant result to prove that state owned firms paid higher corporate income taxes than private firms. Our results also indicate that corporate effective tax rates are positively associated with firm sized and inventory intensity. However, we have no strong evidence to support the association with leverage, return on assets and capital intensity.
机译:为了研究有效税率的可变性,必须考虑少数股东与国有企业的控股股东之间的代理冲突。在中国,国有制通过优化公司所得税帮助政府实现其社会目标。我们提供了一个重要的结果,以证明国有企业缴纳的企业所得税比私营企业高。我们的结果还表明,公司有效税率与公司规模和库存强度呈正相关。但是,我们没有强有力的证据来支持杠杆,资产回报率和资本强度之间的关联。

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