Determinants of Institutional Investor Activism: A Test of the Ryan-Schneider Model (2002)

摘要

If active institutional investors matter to corporate governance, then understanding what influences institutions to become involved also matters. Ryan and Schneider (2002) proposed that the type of institutional investor determines activism. Ryan and Schneider advanced a model that identified a number of antecedents/determinants of activism, including fund size, investment time horizons, performance expectations, pressure sensitivity, legal restraints, and internal or external portfolio management. Using a sample of 102 institutional investors, this study examined that model, but found only partial support - institutional shareholder size, investment time horizon, and internal portfolio management were found to be significant determinants of institutional shareholder activism. However, performance expectations, pressure sensitivity, and legal restraints were not significant antecedents. Overall, the results support the view of institutional shareholder heterogeneity. Not all institutions act the same and even similar institutions do not react to the same stimuli for action in identical ways. Implications for future research and practice are discussed.