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License and entry strategies for an outside innovator in Stackelberg duopoly with royalty and fixed fee under vertical differentiation

机译:垂直分化下的Stackelberg Duopoly的外部创新者的许可和入门策略

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摘要

We examine a choice of options for an outside innovating firm in Stackelberg duopoly under vertical differentiation. The options for an innovating firm are to enter the market with or without licensing its technology for producing a higher-quality good by a combination of royalty and fixed license fee, and to license its technology without entry. When the innovating firm licenses its technology to the incumbent firm without entry, its optimal royalty rate is zero. When the innovating firm enters the market with a license to the incumbent firm, and the cost function is strictly concave, its optimal royalty rate is one such that the incumbent firm drops out of the market with a negative fixed license fee. If the cost function is strictly convex, there is an internal solution of the positive optimal royalty rate with positive or negative fixed license fee. Without entry cost, if the cost function is strictly concave, the entry without license and entry with license strategies are optimal, and if it is strictly convex, the entry with license strategy is optimal.
机译:在垂直分化下,我们在Stackelberg Duopoly中检查了一个外部创新公司的选择。创新公司的选项将在没有授权其通过皇室和固定许可费用和固定许可费用生产更高质量的良好的技术,并在没有进入的情况下许可其技术。当创新公司在没有进入的情况下向现任公司许可其技术时,其最佳版税速率为零。当创新公司与现任公司的许可证进入市场时,成本职能严格凹陷,其最佳版税率是这样的现任公司以否定的许可证费用退出市场。如果成本函数严格凸起,则存在正面的最佳特许权特权率的内部解决方案,具有正面或负固定许可费。如果没有进入成本,如果成本函数严格凹形,则没有许可证和输入许可证策略的条目是最佳的,如果是严格凸起,则具有许可证策略的条目是最佳的。

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