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Legal Disputes Resolved via Game Theoretic Methods

机译:通过博弈论方法解决法律纠纷

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摘要

Mathematical foundations of conflict resolutions are deeply rooted in the theory of cooperative and non-cooperative games. While many elementary models of conflicts are formalized, one often raises the question whether game theory and its mathematically developed tools are applicable to actual legal disputes in practice. We choose an example from union management conflict on hourly wage dispute and how zero sum two person game theory can be used by a judge to bring about the need for realistic compromises between the two parties. We choose another example from the 2000-year old Babylonian Talmud to describe how a certain debt problem was resolved. While they may be unaware of cooperative game theory, their solution methods are fully consistent with the solution concept called the nucleolus of a TU game.
机译:解决冲突的数学基础深深扎根于合作和非合作博弈的理论中。虽然许多基本的冲突模型都已形式化,但人们常常提出一个问题,即博弈论及其数学上开发的工具是否适用于实践中的实际法律纠纷。我们从关于小时工资争议的工会管理冲突以及法官如何使用零和两人博弈论中提出两方之间现实妥协的需要中选择一个例子。我们从具有2000年历史的巴比伦塔木德(Babylonian Talmud)中选择另一个例子来描述如何解决某个债务问题。尽管他们可能不了解合作博弈理论,但其解决方法与称为TU游戏核仁的解决方案概念完全一致。

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