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GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSES AND SIMULATIONS OF ADOPTIONS OF SECURITY POLICIES FOR DRM IN CONTENTS SHARING SCENARIO

机译:内容共享场景下DRM安全策略的博弈分析与模拟

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摘要

A legitimate contents sharing is an essential functionality of DRM (Digital Rights Management)-enabling contents industry and its value chain extension. In order to effectively choose and deploy some typical security policies in a contents sharing scenario, we introduced game theory to analysis the mutual influence of adoptions of trusted computing enabling enhanced security policies on benefits of two stakeholders, which are DRM Providers and contents Sharer who is a category of consumers. A dynamic and mixed game and its algorithm were proposed, where Sharer's strategies were whether to employ the trusted computing enabling devices and related components or not, as well as Providers' strategies included entirely general security, entirely enhanced security and dynamic security policies. We concluded from both game-theoretic analyses and Swarm simulation experiments that the number of acquired sharable digital rights and security cost have a direct effect on Sharer's choices of the enhanced security policy, and also their different basic sharing modes including partial, modest and extensive sharing, further influence the choice of Providers. Besides, with respect to the mixed sharing mode far more similar to a real contents sharing scenario, Dynamic security strategy is superior to the entirely enhanced security in the context of limited sharable rights and higher security costs, but with the acquisition of much more rights and the decrease of enhanced security overhead, the latter strategy would be optimal and stable as a Nash Equilibrium for stakeholders, in combination with the exploitation of effective business models of contents industry.
机译:合法的内容共享是支持DRM(数字版权管理)的内容行业及其价值链扩展的基本功能。为了在内容共享场景中有效选择和部署一些典型的安全策略,我们引入了博弈论来分析采用可信计算的相互影响,从而使增强的安全策略对两个利益相关者(DRM提供者和内容共享者)的利益产生影响。一类消费者。提出了一种动态混合游戏及其算法,其中Sharer的策略是是否使用受信任的计算支持设备和相关组件,而Provider的策略则包括完全通用的安全性,完全增强的安全性和动态安全性策略。我们从博弈论分析和Swarm模拟实验中得出结论,获得的可共享数字版权的数量和安全成本直接影响Sharer选择增强安全策略的选择,以及它们不同的基本共享模式,包括部分,适度和广泛共享,进一步影响提供商的选择。此外,对于更类似于真实内容共享场景的混合共享模式,在有限的可共享权限和较高的安全成本的情况下,动态安全策略优于完全增强的安全性,但是获得了更多的权限和安全性。由于减少了增加的安全性开销,因此后一种策略将是最佳且稳定的策略,可以作为利益相关者的纳什均衡,并结合内容行业有效的商业模式的开发。

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  • 来源
    《Intelligent automation and soft computing》 |2011年第2期|p.191-203|共13页
  • 作者单位

    Electronic & Information Engineering College Henan University of Science & Technology Luoyang 471003 Henan, P.R. of China,Ministry of Education Key Laboratory of Computer Network & Information Security Xidian University Xi'an 710071, Shannxi, P.R. of China;

    Ministry of Education Key Laboratory of Computer Network & Information Security Xidian University Xi'an 710071, Shannxi, P.R. of China;

    Ministry of Education Key Laboratory of Computer Network & Information Security Xidian University Xi'an 710071, Shannxi, P.R. of China;

    The Research Institute China Electronic Equipment & Systems Engineering Corporation Beijing 100141 P.R. of China;

  • 收录信息
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    digital rights management; game theory; trusted computing; algorithm; simulation;

    机译:数字版权管理;博弈论可信计算;算法;仿真;

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