Nietzsche on morality as a 'sign language of the affects'

摘要

This article argues that Nietzsche's meta-ethics is basically a form of sentimentalism (as opposed to cognitivism), but a form of sentimentalism that includes cognitive components in the sentiments that are involved. The article also ascribes to Nietzsche the more original position that the moral sentiments in question vary dramatically between historical periods, cultures, and even individuals, sometimes indeed to the point of becoming inverted between one case and another. Finally, the article also attributes to Nietzsche a hermeneutic insight into certain problems that this situation causes for the accurate interpretation of other people's (moral) viewpoints. Along the way, the article in addition argues that Nietzsche's positions on all these issues were molded not only by such well-known influences as Paul Ree and Hume, but also, and indeed more strongly, by Herder (and Hegel), and it develops some grounds for thinking that the positions in question are highly plausible ones.