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Investing in IT: a new method for improving the efficiency of contract governance in interfirm relationships

机译:投资IT:一种提高红绿核关系中合同治理效率的新方法

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Purpose This study aims to enhance our understanding of how advanced IT improves the efficiency of contract governance in mitigating partners' opportunistic behaviors in interfirm cooperation and the moderating effects of boundary spanners' personal relationships and cooperative orientation. Design/methodology/approach Contract governance is divided into two subdimensions: contract completeness and contract execution safeguards. Then, the hypotheses are examined using partial least squares-based structural equation modeling based on survey data collected from manufacturers in supply chain relationships. Findings The results first demonstrate that advanced IT can improve efficiency in both the design of complete contracts and the provision of contract execution safeguards. Second, the results also show that both the personal relationships between boundary spanners and the cooperative orientation of the firm have different moderating effects. Finally, contract execution safeguards are effective in mitigating partners' opportunistic behaviors, whereas contract completeness is not. Originality/value This study enriches the contract governance literature in two ways. First, it unveils how advanced IT improves the efficiency of contract governance and the effects of two contingent factors (i.e. personal relationships and cooperative orientation), thus extending the research on contract governance. Second, it reveals the different effects of contract completeness and contract execution safeguards on partners' opportunistic behaviors, thus deepening our understanding of the role of contracts in interfirm cooperation.
机译:目的本研究旨在加强我们对促进合作伙伴的机会机会行为的契约治理效率以及边界跨界人士个人关系的调节效应以及合作导向的促进效率如何提高合同治理效率。设计/方法/方法合同治理分为两个副实值:合同完整性和合同执行保障措施。然后,使用基于来自制造商中的供应链关系中的调查数据,使用基于部分最小二乘的结构方程建模检查假设。调查结果首先证明了先进的,它可以提高完整合同设计以及提供合同执行保障的设计。其次,结果还表明,边界扳手与公司的合作定向之间的个人关系都具有不同的调节效果。最后,合同执行保障是有效的减轻伙伴的机会主义行为,而合同完整则没有。本研究以两种方式丰富了合同治理文学的原创性/价值。首先,它推出了如何提高其提高合同治理的效率以及两个截止因素的影响(即个人关系和合作导向),从而扩展了对合同治理的研究。其次,它揭示了合同完整性和合同执行对合作伙伴机会主义行为的不同影响,从而深化了我们对合同在内部合作中的作用的理解。

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