Towards Thwarting Template Side-Channel Attacks in Secure Cloud Deduplications

摘要

As one of a few critical technologies to cloud storage service, deduplication allows cloud servers to save storage space by deleting redundant file copies. However, it often leaks side channel information regarding whether an uploading file gets deduplicated or not. Exploiting this information, adversaries can easily launch a template side-channel attack and severely harm cloud users' privacy. To thwart this kind of attack, we resort to the k-anonymity privacy concept to design secure threshold deduplication protocols. Specifically, we have devised a novel cryptographic primitive called "dispersed convergent encryption" (DCE) scheme, and proposed two different constructions of it. With these DCE schemes, we successfully construct secure threshold deduplication protocols that do not rely on any trusted third party. Our protocols not only support confidentiality protections and ownership verifications, but also enjoy formal security guarantee against template side-channel attacks even when the cloud server could be a "covert adversary" who may violate the predefined threshold and perform deduplication covertly. Experimental evaluations show our protocols enjoy very good performance in practice.