Understanding founder-CEO's replacement in venture-backed companies: A theoretical and empirical analysis

摘要

This research provides an accurate picture of situations in which founder-CEOs are replaced (or not) by venture capitalists. Our analysis aims to go further than the schematic case of the founder being simply dismissed by investors in a conflictual context. We first review the literature dedicated to this subject in the light of the agency theory (AT) and the resource-based view (RBV). However, the limits of these theoretical frameworks lead us to investigate their extensions: the entrenchment theory (ET), the dynamic capabilities approach (DCA) and the cognitive governance perspective (CGP). In a second phase, in order to decode the replacement process, we designed an exploratory methodology based on qualitative data, thus deepening our understanding of the issues it entails in venture-backed companies. Finally, this field analysis allows us to build a typology of replacement scenarii, with each scenario being interpreted by combining relevant theories to explain all aspects of it. In line with the AT, the ET focuses on the FCs strategy to retain their position. The DCA analyses the CEOs' resources from a dynamic angle, in accordance with the RBV. The CGP is mobilised to characterise a conflict originating in a lack of skills. These results lead us to rethink the role of time and the nature of conflicts in the relationships between FCs and venture capitalists.