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首页> 外文期刊>Frontiers in Psychology >The Gender Pay Gap: Can Behavioral Economics Provide Useful Insights?
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The Gender Pay Gap: Can Behavioral Economics Provide Useful Insights?

机译:性别差距:行为经济学能否提供有用的见解?

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A large proportion of behavioral economics studies rely on various economic games, which have the advantage to depict a decisional situation in a simplified form. The Ultimatum Game (UG, Güth et al., 1982) is a decision-making task that illustrates a negotiation scenario. The standard UG involves two players. The first player, also known as the proposer, has the task of dividing a certain amount of money with a second player, called the responder. The responder can choose to accept or reject the received offer. Should the responder accept the offer, the money is divided between the two players per the proposer's offer. However, if the responder decides to reject the offer, then neither player gets any money. Most frequently, when participating in an UG task, both players are informed regarding the rules of the game, the amount of money that is to be shared and the consequences of their possible actions (Güth and Kocher, 2014). Based on two economic assumptions, namely participants' rationality and their interest in maximizing their gain (Camerer and Fehr, 2006), the normative solution for the UG would be for the proposer to send the minimum possible amount to the responder. For the responder, it would be expected to accept any non-zero amount. Nevertheless, both players behave in a significantly different manner compared to the normative behavior. More specifically, it was found that most proposers offer a larger proportion of the pie to share, approximately 50% of the total amount. Also, responders' behavior deviates from normative expectations because lower offers, of 20% or less of the total amount, are rejected by most participants (Camerer, 2003).
机译:大部分行为经济学研究都依赖于各种经济博弈,这些博弈具有以简化形式描述决策情况的优势。 《最后通Game博弈》(UG,Güth等人,1982)是一项决策任务,说明了谈判场景。标准UG涉及两个参与者。第一个玩家,也称为提议者,其任务是与第二个玩家(称为响应者)分配一定数量的钱。响应者可以选择接受或拒绝收到的报价。如果响应者接受要约,则根据提议者的要约在两个参与者之间分配金钱。但是,如果响应者决定拒绝要约,则任何玩家都不会得到任何金钱。最常见的是,在参加UG任务时,会告知两个玩家游戏规则,应分享的金额以及其可能采取的行动的后果(Güth和Kocher,2014年)。基于两个经济学假设,即参与者的合理性和他们最大程度地获得收益的兴趣(Camerer和Fehr,2006年),UG的规范解决方案是提议者将尽可能少的金额发送给响应者。对于响应者,可以接受任何非零的金额。然而,与规范行为相比,两个参与者的行为方式都大不相同。更具体地,发现大多数提议者提供更大份额的馅饼来分享,大约占总数的50%。而且,响应者的行为偏离了规范的期望,因为较低的报价(占总量的20%或更少)被大多数参与者拒绝(Camerer,2003年)。

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