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The Complexity Analysis for Price Game Model of Risk-Averse Supply Chain Considering Fairness Concern

机译:考虑公平性的规避风险的供应链价格博弈模型的复杂性分析

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This paper, considering risk aversion and fair concern, establishes a dynamic price game model of a dual-channel supply chain in which dual-channel retailer sells products through traditional channel and online channel and the online retailer only sells products through online channel. The stability of the system and the influences of different parameter values on utilities are analyzed emphatically using game theory and nonlinear dynamic theory, such as 2D and 3D bifurcation diagram, parameter plot basin, chaos attractor, and sensitivity to initial value. The results find that the system is more likely to lose stability and fall into chaos with the customer demand fluctuating greatly. The system enters into chaos through flip bifurcation with the increase of the price adjustment speed; adjusting the risk-aversion levels or the fairness concern levels of the two retailers can make the system be in a stable state or delay the occurrence of system instability. When the system is in chaos, the average utility of the online retailer will decrease and one of the dual-channel retailers will increase. Using the state feedback control method, the system can return to a stable state from chaos by selecting appropriate control parameters. The research of this paper is of great significance to the decision-makers’ price decision and supply chain operation management.
机译:本文考虑风险规避和合理关注,建立了双渠道供应链的动态价格博弈模型,其中双渠道零售商通过传统渠道和在线渠道销售产品,而在线零售商仅通过在线渠道销售产品。运用博弈论和非线性动力学理论,如2D和3D分叉图,参数图盆地,混沌吸引子以及对初始值的敏感性,着重分析了系统的稳定性以及不同参数值对效用的影响。结果发现,随着客户需求的大幅波动,该系统更有可能失去稳定性并陷入混乱。随着价格调整速度的提高,系统通过翻转分叉进入混乱状态。调整两个零售商的风险规避水平或公平关注水平可以使系统处于稳定状态或延迟系统不稳定的发生。当系统陷入混乱时,在线零售商的平均效用将下降,而双渠道零售商之一将增加。使用状态反馈控制方法,系统可以通过选择适当的控制参数从混乱状态恢复到稳定状态。本文的研究对决策者的价格决策和供应链运作管理具有重要意义。

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