首页> 美国卫生研究院文献>International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health >A Dynamic Price Game Model in a Low-Carbon Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Return Rates and Fairness Concern Behaviors
【2h】

A Dynamic Price Game Model in a Low-Carbon Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Return Rates and Fairness Concern Behaviors

机译:考虑回报率和公平问题的低碳闭环供应链动态价格博弈模型

代理获取
本网站仅为用户提供外文OA文献查询和代理获取服务,本网站没有原文。下单后我们将采用程序或人工为您竭诚获取高质量的原文,但由于OA文献来源多样且变更频繁,仍可能出现获取不到、文献不完整或与标题不符等情况,如果获取不到我们将提供退款服务。请知悉。

摘要

In this paper, we developed a dynamic price game model for a low-carbon, closed-loop supply chain system in which (1) the manufacturer had fairness concern and carbon emission reduction (CER) behaviors, and market share and profit maximization were their objectives, and (2) the retailer showed fairness concern behaviors in market competition and provided service input to reduce return rates. The retailer recycled old products from customers, and the manufacturer remanufactured the recycled old products. The effects of different parameter values on the stability and utility of the dynamic price game model were determined through analysis and numerical simulation. Results found that an increasing customer loyalty to the direct marketing channel decreased the stable region of the manufacturer’s price adjustment and increase that of the retailer. The stable region of the system shrank with an increase of CER and the retailer’s service level, which expanded with return rates. The dynamic system entered into chaos through flip bifurcation with the increase of price adjustment speed. In the chaotic state, the average utilities of the manufacturer and retailer all declined, while that of the retailer declined even more. Changes to parameter values had a great impact on the utilities of the manufacturer and retailer. By selecting appropriate control parameters, the dynamic system can return to a stable state from chaos again. The research of this paper is of great significance to participants’ price decision-making and supply chain operation management.
机译:在本文中,我们为低碳闭环供应链系统开发了一个动态价格博弈模型,其中(1)制造商关注公平性和碳减排(CER)行为,而市场份额和利润最大化是他们的目标。目标;(2)零售商在市场竞争中表现出公平关注行为,并提供服务投入以降低退货率。零售商从客户那里回收旧产品,制造商重新制造回收的旧产品。通过分析和数值模拟,确定了不同参数值对动态价格博弈模型的稳定性和效用的影响。结果发现,客户对直销渠道的忠诚度提高,降低了制造商价格调整的稳定区域,而增加了零售商的价格调整区域。随着CER的增加和零售商的服务水平随退货率的增加而扩大,系统的稳定区域缩小了。随着价格调整速度的增加,动态系统通过翻转分叉进入混乱状态。在混乱状态下,制造商和零售商的平均效用均下降,而零售商的平均效用下降得更多。参数值的更改对制造商和零售商的效用有很大影响。通过选择适当的控制参数,动态系统可以再次从混乱状态恢复到稳定状态。本文的研究对参与者的价格决策和供应链运作管理具有重要意义。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
代理获取

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号