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Finance, corporate value and credit market freedom in overinvesting US firms

机译:金融,企业价值和信用市场在过度投资中的自由

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Purpose - Using a sample of US firms more likely to be affected by agency problems, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between corporate value and financial policies and to study whether credit market freedom (CMF) affects this relationship. Design/methodology/approach - The authors identify a sub-sample of non-financial US firms potentially affected by agency problems using a joint criterion of over-investment and high cash-holdings. A generalized method of moment econometric framework is then used to estimate the impact of cash-holdings and leverage policies on firm value for this sub-sample. This exercise is also performed by taking into account the level of CMF of the state where the firm operates. Findings - The results show that the relationship between cash-holdings - or leverage - and firm value is "U-shaped." In addition, when the authors focus on the role played by the level of CMF, the authors find a number of interesting facts: CMF facilitates the firms' access to external finance, thereby relaxing the need of internal funds for investing; the relationship between cash-holdings and firm value is "U-shaped" only in states enjoying high levels of CMF; the probability of observing firms more likely to be affected by agency problems is higher in states with high levels of CMF. Research limitations/implications - The empirical findings provide important insights to policymakers, shareholders and practitioners. To policymakers, the results suggest that providing institutional environments with greater CMF can enhance the firm access to external finance, the level of corporate investment and the economic growth. To shareholders, the findings highlight that the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders may be more severe in states with higher CMF; therefore, adequate financing policies and corporate governance mechanisms must be used to mitigate these conflicts and maximize the firm value. Finally, to practitioners, the evidence suggests that, in valuing a firm, they must take into consideration whether the economic environment provides managers with more freedom to stockpile cash and invest sub-optimally. Originality/value - The paper contributes to the corporate finance and governance literature in two respects. First, it provides new evidence on the shape of the relationship between cash holdings and firm value for firms affected by empire-building managers. Second, at the best of the knowledge, it is the first corporate finance study, which analyzes the role played by the CMF at the state level on the capital structure and the level of investment of the firms.
机译:目的 - 使用美国公司的样本更有可能受到机构问题的影响,本文的目的是调查企业价值和财务政策之间的关系,并研究信用市场自由(CMF)是否影响这种关系。设计/方法/方法 - 作者标识了使用过度投资和高现金持有的联合标准可能受代理问题影响的非金融美国公司的子样本。然后,使用一般的时刻计量框架的方法来估计现金持有的影响,并利用杠杆政策对该子样本的坚固价值。该练习也通过考虑到公司运行的状态的CMF水平来进行。调查结果 - 结果表明,现金持股 - 或杠杆 - 和牢固价值之间的关系是“U形”。此外,当作者关注CMF水平的作用时,作者发现了一些有趣的事实:CMF促进了公司进入外部金融,从而放松了内部资金的投资需求;现金持股和公司价值之间的关系是享受高水平CMF级别的国家的“U形”;观察公司更有可能受代理问题影响的概率在高水平的CMF中较高。研究限制/影响 - 实证调查结果为政策制定者,股东和从业者提供了重要的见解。对政策制定者来说,结果表明,提供更大的CMF的制度环境可以增强对外部金融,企业投资水平和经济增长的努力进入。对于股东,调查结果强调,经理人和股东之间的利益冲突可能在较高CMF的国家中更严重;因此,必须使用足够的融资政策和公司治理机制来减轻这些冲突并最大限度地提高公司价值。最后,对于从业者来说,证据表明,在评估公司的情况下,他们必须考虑到经济环境是否为管理者提供更多自由,以储存现金和投资。原创性/价值 - 论文有助于两方面的企业融资和治理文学。首先,它为受帝国建设经理影响的公司的现金持股和公司价值与公司价值之间的关系形式提供了新的证据。其次,尽管如此,它是第一个公司财务研究,分析了CMF在资本结构和公司投资水平上的国家级别发挥的作用。

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