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CORNEA, Scepticism and Evil

机译:怀疑论与邪恶

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The Principle of Credulity: ‘It is basic to human knowledge of the world that we believe things are as they seem to be in the absence of positive evidence to the contrary’‘Swinburne 19969. Swinburne, Richard. 1996. Is There a God? , Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. [CrossRef]View all references: 133]. This underlies the Evidential Problem of Evil, which goes roughly like this: ‘There appears to be a lot of suffering, both animal and human, that does not result in an equal or greater utility. So there's probably some pointless suffering. As God's existence precludes pointless suffering, theism is implausible.’ CORNEA is the principle that observation O raises hypothesis H's probability only if O is more probable given H than it is given not-H. Theists sometimes maintain that apparently pointless suffering is just as likely given theism as atheism (I support this claim by appealing to a Lewisian account of the relevant counterfactuals). Given CORNEA, therefore, what we see of suffering does not make theism unlikely. I maintain that a consequence of so deploying CORNEA is that CORNEA and the Principle of Credulity are incompatible. We are left with a sceptical paradox. CORNEA is a consequence of Bayes's Theorem, I argue; but it is incompatible with a presupposition of empirical science, namely, that appearances create epistemic warrant, ceteris paribus. External-world probability scepticism follows. I treat the paradox as real. First, I offer an account of how we strike a balance in practice between CORNEA, on the one hand, and the Principle of Credulity and the scientific enterprise on the other. Second, I try to resolve the paradox outright by rejecting the Principle of Credulity and maintaining that the scientific project remains well motivated even allowing probability scepticism. On either response to the paradox, the Evidential Problem of Evil continues to have serious, but defeasible, force against theism.View full textDownload full textRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048400903490551
机译:诚信原则:“人类相信世界的基础是,我们认为事物的存在似乎缺乏相反的积极证据” ——Swinburne19969。Swinburne,Richard。 1996.有上帝吗? ,牛津和纽约:牛津大学出版社。 [CrossRef]查看所有参考:133]。这是邪恶的证据问题的基础,该问题大致如下:–似乎存在着许多动物和人类的苦难,没有带来同等或更大的效用。因此,可能会有一些毫无意义的痛苦。由于上帝的存在排除了无穷无尽的痛苦,所以有神论是不可行的。CORNEA是一个原理,即只有当O给定H的概率大于非给定H的概率时,观察O才会提出假设H的概率。有神论者有时坚持认为,无神论者和无神论者一样,似乎毫无意义的痛苦(我通过诉诸于刘易斯对有关反事实的陈述来支持这一主张)。因此,鉴于CORNEA,我们对苦难的见识并不能使有神论不可能。我坚持认为,如此部署CORNEA的后果是CORNEA和诚信原则不兼容。我们留下了怀疑的悖论。我认为CORNEA是贝叶斯定理的结果。但是它与经验科学的前提是不相容的,也就是说,外表会产生认知上的保证,即塞特里斯·帕里布斯。随之而来的是外部世界的可能性怀疑论。我认为悖论是真实的。首先,我要说明的是,一方面我们如何在实践中达到平衡,另一方面,诚信原则与科学事业之间如何实现平衡。其次,我试图通过拒绝可信性原则并坚持认为科学项目即使在允许概率怀疑主义的情况下也具有良好的动机,才能彻底解决这一悖论。在对悖论的任何一种回应上,邪恶的证据问题仍然具有严重的,但可废除的反对有神论的力量。查看全文下载全文,technorati,可口,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,更多”,发布号:“ ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b”};添加到候选列表链接永久链接http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048400903490551

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